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Abstract—We present a work in progress strategy for imple-
menting privacy in Nano at the consensus level, that can be
of independent interest. Nano is a cryptocurrency that uses an
Open Representative Voting (ORV) as a consensus mechanism,
a variant of Delegated Proof of Stake. Each transaction on the
network is voted on by representatives and each vote has a weight
equal to the percentage of their total delegated balance. Every
account can delegate their stake to any other account (including
itself) and change it anytime it wants. The fundamental goal of
this paper is to construct a tool for the consensus algorithm
to function without knowing the individual balances of each
account. The tool is composed of three different schemes. The first
is a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme based on Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme, used to generate a secret amongst a set
of distributed parties, which will be a private key of an additive
homomorphic ElGamal cryptosystem over elliptic curves. The
second is a polynomials commitment scheme used to make the
previous scheme verifiable, i.e., without the need for a trusted
dealer. Finally, the third scheme is used to decrypt an ElGamal
ciphertext without reconstructing the private key, which, because
of this, can be used multiple times.
Index Terms—Nano, block lattice, privacy, weighted threshold,
secret sharing, additive homomorphic encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin appeared in 2008 [1] and is widely considered to
be the first decentralised cryptocurrency. Its ingenious design,
that uses a blockchain as a ledger to store the transactions that
happen on the network and a Proof of Work algorithm to reach
a decentralised consensus about the state of that blockchain,
allowed it to thrive and even today it is the most well known
and most valuable cryptocurrency.
However, this design also has limitations that prevent
Bitcoin from being what it was meant to be: a peer-to-
peer electronic cash system. These are its inability to scale,
its restricted maximum throughput, slow confirmation times,
ledger size and lack of privacy.
Many cryptocurrencies were created in the last years that
tried to solve these limitations, but so far none of them was
able to solve them all. Most of them are based on the Bitcoin
design so this can be a difficult task. Two examples of this are
Monero [2] and ZCash [3], that solve the privacy issue, but
still share the same other limitations of Bitcoin.
On the other hand, cryptocurrencies based on Delegated
Proof of Stake, like Tezos [4], or based on practical Byzantine
Fault Consensus [5], like Stellar [6], improve on the maximum
throughput and slow confirmation times, but still are only
pseudo-anonymous.
Perhaps the most efficient way to solve the design flaws
of Bitcoin is to create a new design altogether. This is what
the cryptocurrency Nano did [7]. This is a cryptocurrency that
uses a block-lattice instead of a single blockchain and also uses
a different consensus mechanism called Open Representative
Voting (ORV), a variant of Delegated Proof of Stake. These
will be explained in detail in the next section, as well as how
they solve Bitcoin’s issues of scalability, maximum throughput
and confirmation times of transactions.
One issue that Nano doesn’t solve is privacy, and as far as
we know, there isn’t any work about it, at least at the protocol
level. Since Nano is fundamentally different from Bitcoin, any
implementation of privacy will therefore be different as well.
This goal of this paper is to develop a tool that can be
used to implement privacy in Nano at the protocol level. The
tool is composed of three different schemes. The first is a
weighted threshold secret sharing scheme based on Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [8] which is used to generate, in a
distributed way, a secret that will be a private key of an
additive ElGamal cryptosystem over elliptic curves (EC-EG)
[9], which is additive homomorphic. The second scheme is the
polynomials commitment scheme presented in [10], which is
an improvement of [11], and is used to make the previous
scheme verifiable, i.e., without the need for a trusted dealer.
Finally, the third scheme is used to decrypt a ciphertext of the
EC-EG cryptosystem without reconstructing the private key,
which, because of that, can be used multiple times.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section
II a brief resume of the design of Nano is given, describing
the characteristics that make it different from Bitcoin; section
III discusses how privacy can be implemented in Nano and
section IV proposes a tool to implement it at the consensus
level. Section V is a discussion of the tool and open issues.
The last section consists of the conclusions and future work.
II. DESIGN OVERVIEW OF NANO1
A. The Block Lattice
Nano uses a ledger structure based on parallel blockchains,
called a block-lattice (Figure 1), where every node maintains
its own local blockchain (only the account owner can add
blocks to it), as well as a copy of the other nodes blockchains
at a given time [12].
1The information in this section is taken from https://docs.nano.org/
Fig. 1. The Block Lattice.
The block lattice structure allows for asynchronous trans-
actions, since a transaction does not have to be included in
a block together with other account transactions. To effect a
transaction, an account computes a block and sends it to a set
of peers, which in turn send it to other peers. As the block is
being propagated through the network it will be voted on by
the representatives. Once a certain threshold of votes has been
achieved the transaction is considered confirmed.
There are three different types of blocks in Nano: send, for
sending transactions; receive, for receiving transactions; and
change, for changing the representative of the account. The
first block of a new account must be a receive block.
After a send block is validated by the network, the transac-
tion becomes ”pending” and can’t be reversed. The receiving
account can pocket the funds anytime and, for that, it only has
to send the corresponding receive block to its peers, which will
then be propagated through the network and voted on as well.
B. The Consensus Mechanism
Nano uses as consensus mechanism a variant of Delegated
Proof of Stake (DPoS) called Open Representative Voting
(ORV). Any node can be a representative and any account
can delegate its voting weight to a representative at anytime
(including itself), which will vote on transactions on its behalf.
Representatives with ≥ 0.1% (of the total supply) voting
weight delegated to it are termed Principal Representatives
(PR), and only their votes are rebroadcast by other nodes, to
decrease the bandwidth consumption of the network.
As these votes are propagated through the network, they are
summed up and then compared against the total online voting
weight available. A block is confirmed if it gets enough votes
to reach a quorum, which happens very fast (in less than a
second) if the network is not saturated.
When there is a conflict between transactions on the net-
work, representatives change their vote to converge to only
one transaction, quickly resolving the fork.
Since transactions have no fees and the supply is fixed, there
is no monetary reward paid to representatives for validating
transactions and thus it is of utmost importance that the
network is the most efficient as possible in terms of resource
consumption.
There are though indirect incentives, as maintaining a node
is less expensive for a vendor than paying transaction fees
using other networks, and can also attract new costumers,
thereby increasing revenue.
C. Block Specification
In Nano, a block contains all the information about an
account at that point in time, which allows ledger pruning:
account address, balance and representative (Table 1). The link
field describes the type of the block (send, receive or change)
and the destination address for a send block or the hash of the
block of the sending address in the case of a receive block.
The signature proves the authenticity of the transaction
and the work is a small, user-generated Proof-of-Work (PoW)
used as a Quality-of-Service prioritisation and spam prevention
mechanism. When the network is saturated, a user can generate
a higher PoW value, ensuring thereby that the transaction gets











Right now, all fields of a block are transparent. A privacy
implementation would need to obfuscate fields, in particular:
previous, balance and signature. In the following section we
discuss how this could be done for the balance.
III. HOW TO IMPLEMENT PRIVACY IN NANO?
As shown in the previous section, Nano uses a consensus
mechanism that relies on knowing the total balances that
are delegated to representatives (that can include their own
individual balances or not) to function. However, it doesn’t
need to know the individual balances of the accounts that
delegate to a certain representative.
Moreover, total delegated balances of representatives, i.e.,
voting weights, are trended over two weeks and, because of
that, change slowly through time.
Our idea for implementing privacy in Nano at the consensus
level is based on these premises. First, we need a cryptosystem
that is additive homomorphic, so that a representative can
decrypt the total of a sum without decrypting its individual
components, which would be the encrypted balances of the
accounts. We want this cryptosystem to be as efficient as
possible, in computation time (encryption and decryption) and
2ahttps://docs.nano.org/integration-guides/the-basics/
in bandwidth (generating a small size ciphertext). We also
need a scheme for generating a private key for the previous
cryptosystem in a distributed way (without a trusted dealer),
and we want each part to have a weight on the scheme
proportional to their voting weight on the network. This private
key will be used to generate a public key that will be used by
all accounts to encrypt the balances and transaction amounts.
From time to time (to be defined), the voting weights
will have to be updated and, for that to happen, the new
total delegated balances will have to be known. Therefore,
we also need a way to decrypt the total delegated balances
without reconstructing the private key, otherwise all individual
balances could be also decrypted. Moreover, we want that
parts with a certain threshold of total weight can make this
decryption.
For efficiency purposes, this scheme will only be run by
Principal Representatives, which can be at most 1000.
IV. THE SCHEME
Based on the requirements stated in the previous section,
we now present a scheme for implementing privacy in Nano
at the consensus level, which has three different components: a
weighted threshold secret sharing scheme, which will generate
an asymmetric cryptosystem in a distributed fashion; a way to
make this scheme verifiable, and, finally, a way to decrypt
the ciphertexts of the cryptosystem without reconstructing the
private key.
A. Notation
We follow the same notation used in the papers in which
the schemes are based on, in the following way:
• Z is the ring of integers and [n] is the set 1, 2, ..., n of n
elements.
• Fp and Fq are finite fields of p and q elements respec-
tively, with p, q ∈ Z.
• i and j represent the individual elements of [n], with
i 6= j, unless stated otherwise.
• Pi and Pj are the participants of a scheme.
• R[x] is the univariate polynomial ring in the variable x
over R, R being a ring.
• deg(f(x)) is the degree of f(x) ∈ R[x].
• <group> is a bilinear group parsed as a tuple
(G1, G2, GT , p,G,H, e).
• G1 and G2 are two additive groups of prime order p and
GT is a multiplicative group of the same order p.
• G is an element of G1 that generates a QRp subgroup
of order q and H is an element generator of G2.
• e : G1 x G2 → GT is a pairing that satisfies the properties
of bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability [13].
B. A weighted threshold secret sharing scheme
In our weighted threshold secret sharing scheme (n, t) we
want to generate a secret s and divide it into n parts, si, in a
distributed way. With t or more parts, the secret s can be easily
reconstructed, and with less than t parts you get no knowledge
about it. For this, we are going to use Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [8], in the following way:
1) Pi chooses a polynomial fi(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree t− 1,
with fi(0) = xi being the subsecret of each Pi.
2) Pi computes W =
∑n
i=1 wi point/s of the polynomial
fi(x) for x = 1,...,W .
3) Each Pi sends to each Pj wj of these point/s. These
points are called the the subsecret private share/s sik =






4) Each Pi will calculate wi secret private shares sk =∑n
i=1 sik = (k,
∑n
i=1 fi(k)).
5) The secret x = f(0), with f(x) =
∑n
i=1 fi(x), can be










, j 6= k (1)
C. A verifiable weighted threshold secret sharing scheme
In this section we show how we can make the previous
scheme verifiable. This can be achieved if Pj can verify
that the subsecret private shares sik are indeed points of the
polynomials fi(x).
Feldman’s scheme [14] allows for this, however it requires
commitments for every coefficient of fi(x), which doesn’t
scale very well for large polynomials.
Because of this, we use instead the scheme proposed in
[10], an improvement to [11], that allows multiple univariate
polynomial commitments for a single degree bound and a
single evaluation over a field family F.
For efficiency purposes, we will use the construction in the
algebraic group model.
The scheme is composed of the following tuple of al-
gorithms PC = (Setup, Commit, Open, Check), defined as
following:
Setup. On input a security parameter λ and a maxi-
mum degree bound D ∈ N , PC.Setup samples public
parameters (ck, rk) as follows. Sample a bilinear group
<group> ← SampleGrp(1λ), and parse <group> as a tuple
(G1, G2, GT , p,G,H, e). Sample random elements β ∈ Fq .
Then compute the vector∑
:=
(
G, βG, β2G, ..., βDG
)
∈ GD+11
These parameters can be calculated in a distributed way,
where Pi chooses a βi and broadcasts βiG,β2iG,...,β
D
i G.
Values can be verified by checking that e(βiG,H) =
e(G, βiH), e(β
2
i , H) = e(βiG, βiH), ..., e(β
D
i , H) =
e(βD−1i , βiH).












Set ck := (<group>,
∑
) and rk := (D, <group>, βH),
and then output the public parameters (ck, rk).
3As an example, consider three participants P1, P2, P3 with weights 4, 3
and 2 respectively. Then P1 will generate a polynomial f1(x) with private
secret x1 and calculate 9 points s1k = (k, fi(k)), for k = 1, ..., 9.
P1 then sends the points s15, s16, s17 to P2 and the points s18, s19 to P3.
These public parameters will support polynomials over the
field Fq[x] of degree at most D.
Commit. On input ck, univariate polynomial p over Fq[x],
PC.Commit outputs the commitment c that is computed as
follows:
• If deg(p(x)) > D, abort.
• Otherwise, output c := p(β)G.
Note that because pi has degree at most D, the above terms
are linear combinations of terms in ck.
Open. On input ck, univariate polynomial p(x) over Fq ,
evaluation point z ∈ Fq , opening challenge ε ∈ Fq , PC.Open
outputs the evaluation proof π in G1, that is computed
as follows. Compute the linear combination of polynomials
p(x)′ = εp and witness polynomial w(x) := p(x)
′−p(z)
x−z . Set
w := w(β)G ∈ G1. The evaluation proof is π := (w).
Check. On input rk, commitment c, evaluation point z ∈
Fq , alleged evaluation v, evaluation proof π, and randomness
ε ∈ Fq , PC.Check proceeds as follows. Compute the linear
combination C := εc, then compute the linear combination of
evaluation y := εv and check the evaluation proof via equality
e = (C − yG,H) = e(w, βH − zH).
This protocol can be made zero-knowledge by having the
prover send vG instead of v.
With this protocol, the subsecret private shares can be
verified in the following way:
1) Pi uses PC.Commit algorithm to commit to fi(x), with
D = t− 1, and sends it to all participants.
2) Pi makes a proof evaluation of sikG using PC.Open al-
gorithm and sends it to Pj , so that the other participants
can verify sik without getting to know it.
D. Decrypting without reconstructing the secret
As already stated, the secret distributed in the previous
scheme will be the private key of an asymmetric cryptosystem,
and will generate the public key that will be used to encrypt
the balances of the network. This section proposes a scheme
to decrypt these ciphertexts without reconstructing the private
key.
According to [9], the most efficient cryptosystem for this
purpose is the additive ElGamal over elliptic curves (EC-EG),
whose key set-up consists of an elliptic curve G1 over Fp with
a generator G of order q. Its security is based upon the Elliptic
Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP).
x ∈ Fq is the private key of the system and Y =∑n
i fi(0)G =
∑n
i xiG = xG ∈ G1 is the public key. The
public key can be verified using the previous scheme, with a
proof evaluation that fi(0)G comes indeed from the previously
committed fi(x) polynomial.
There is an efficient and invertible function map() that maps
values (e.g. plaintexts) into points on the curve, and vice versa.
The encryption of plaintext m is done the following way:
• M = map(m) is a point on G1.
• r is a random value ∈ Fq.
• ciphertext C = (C1, C2), where C1 = rG and C2 =
M + rY .
The decryption process is done in the following way:
• M = −xC1 + C2 = −xrG+M + xrG.
• m = rmap(M), where rmap() is the inverse function
of map() and m is, in this specific case, the balance of
an account.
In this scheme we don’t want the private key to be recon-
structed during the decryption process, in order to be able to
use it to decrypt multiple ciphertexts. For that, we can use the
distributed decryption based on [15], in the following way:





j−k is public and can be calculated
by any participant.
2) skC1 can be proved correct with an equality proof
of logarithms [16] of skG and skC1, with skG =∑n
i=1 sikG.
3) The message can be decrypted as M = C2−
∑t
k=1Dk.
This protocol will be run by the Principal Representatives
to update their own weights. Any other account that wants
to know what its total delegated voting weight is will have
to request Principal Representatives for decryption. After this,
the protocol will have to be run again and a new cryptosystem
will be generated with the new voting weights.
V. DISCUSSION
The scheme proposed in this paper can be used to implement
privacy in Nano at the consensus level. However, this approach
has several issues that still need to be solved.
One is that, in the additive homomorphic variant of the
EC-ElGamal scheme, it is necessary to reverse the mapping
function in order to map an elliptic curve point M back to
a numeric value m. In Nano, the balance field has 128 bits,
which is large, so either the encrypted balance will have to
be composed of various ElGamal ciphertexts (4 ∗ 32 bits) or
another additive homomorphic cryptosystem will have to be
used [9].
Another issue is that the decryption protocol can create a
new attack vector on the network, namely with thousands
of accounts asking Principal Representatives for decryption
and thereby clogging the network. Therefore, some kind of
mechanism will be needed to prevent this, like a proof of a
minimum balance.
Also, since Nano’s network is asynchronous, nodes do not
have a sense of time, neither do they share the same state
of the network at a given time. Because of this, it can be
difficult to reach consensus about these values (time and state)
for the update of the voting weights. One way to do this can
be to define a probabilistic condition that must be fulfilled
for the update to take place. For example, if a block on the
network is produced with a hash that has x number of zeros
and if the representative of the account that produced that
block is a Principal Representative, he can be the initiator of
the protocol for updating the voting weights. He sums the
encrypted delegated balances of the Principal Representatives
based on his state of the network and sends the totals to the
rest of the PRs. If they agree, the decryption process begins
based on that state of the network.
Another question that arises with our scheme is if it is
possible to maintain the cryptosystem after the update of
voting weights without compromising its security, changing
only the private shares of the Principal Representatives. If not,
a new cryptosystem, with a new private and public key, will
have to be generated and the difficulty lies in the network
making this transition, namely how the nodes know what is
the new public key and how do they prove that the balance
encrypted with the previous public key is equal to the balance
encrypted with the new public key.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented ongoing work towards
implementing privacy in Nano. A secret sharing scheme was
presented that goes some way in implementing privacy at the
consensus level. However, practical and theoretical limitations
still need to be investigated further as shown in the many issues
and problems outlined in the discussion.
Future work will focus on solving the identified issues
and developing a robust implementation of the scheme. The
security and performance of the secret sharing scheme outlined
in this paper will be evaluated and compared to other secret
sharing schemes. After implementing privacy at the consensus
level, research will be focused on implementing privacy at the
transaction level, with the intent to obfuscate also sender’s and
receiver’s addresses.
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